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1 Introduction
The wave of currency and banking crises that began
in 1997 in East Asia generated a broad consensus
that fundamental reforms were required in the
international financial system. Particularly during
1997 and 1998, the view became dominant that
existing institutions and mechanisms were
inadequate for preventing and managing crises in
the dramatically changed world of the twenty-first
century. It has become increasingly evident that
achieving stability requires changes to the
international financial architecture itself, though
as discussed below, change at the international level
has been insufficient.
Besides the objective of achieving international
financial stability, an equally important objective,
to which insufficient attention has been given, is
the provision of adequate capital flows, both private
and public, to different categories of developing
economies. The two major goals for a new
international financial architecture from a
developmental perspective are thus: (a) to prevent
currency and banking crises and better manage
them when they occur, and (b) to support the
adequate provision of net private and public flows
to developing countries, including, in particular,
low-income ones.
In this article, we attempt to assess progress on
international financial reform, in relation to these
two goals. In this sense, our article is broader than
most of the literature on the subject, which has
focused on achieving international financial stability
and avoiding contagion. To the extent that private
capital flows do not recover sufficiently (either
spontaneously or encouraged by government
policies), a greater role would need to be played by
official liquidity and development finance. A
particular source of concern is that an important
part of this decline may be the result of structural
factors such as the fact that banks have increasingly
“crossed the border” by buying or establishing local
banks and subsidiaries in developing countries,
from which they lend in local currency (Griffith-
Jones 2001; IMF 2003). This would imply that net
private flows to developing countries could remain
very low for a fairly long time period.
Progress on international reform so far has
suffered five serious problems.
First, there has been no agreed international
reform agenda. In this regard, the ‘Monterrey
Consensus’ of the International Conference on
Financing for Development of theUnitedNations,
held in March 2002 (see United Nations 2002),
provided, for the first time, an agreed comprehensive
and balanced international agenda that should be
used to guide and evaluate reform efforts.
Second, the progress made has been uneven and
asymmetrical in several key aspects. The focus of
reforms has been largely on strengthening
macroeconomic policies and financial regulation
in developing countries – in other words, on the
national component of the architecture – while far
less progress has been made on the international
and, particularly, the regional components. These
are major weaknesses, as crises have not just been
caused by country problems (even though these
have been obviously important), but also by
imperfections in international capital markets, such
as herding, that lead to rapid surges and reversals
of massive private flows, and multiple equilibria,
that may lead countries into self-fulfilling or deeper
crises.1
Third, the reform effort has been focused
excessively on crisis prevention andmanagement,
mainly for middle-income countries.This may have
led to a neglect of the equally, if not more, important
issues of appropriate liquidity and development
finance for low-income countries. Moreover, the
problem of availability of development finance has
clearly moved to centre stage for all developing
economies. Thus, although some of the reforms
adopted will be crucial in the future to help prevent
a new wave of crises, the problem at present is the
opposite one, of insufficient private flows. This
situation is likely to continue for several years.
Therefore, an important task is to designmeasures,
which will both encourage higher levels of private
flows (especially long-term flows) and will provide
counter-cyclical official flows (both for liquidity
and for development finance purposes) during the
periods when private flows are insufficient.Without
this combination of private and official flows, the
financial system will not be able to contribute
effectively to economic growth and the achievement
of the millennium development goals.
Progress has also been uneven in the realm of
crisis prevention and management. In the area of
crisis prevention, much work has been done in
relation to strengthening domestic financial systems
in developing countries and in drafting international
codes and standards for macroeconomic and
financial regulation, but few steps have been taken
to guarantee amore coherent macroeconomicpolicy
approach at the global level. Also, the drafting of
new InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) financing
facilities has received much more attention than
international debt standstills and workout
procedures. Some advance has been made in
redefining IMF conditionality. The IMF quota
increase and the extension of the arrangements to
borrow, which became effective in 1999, has also
been an advance, but several proposals made on
the more active use of Special Drawing Rights
(SDRs) as amechanism of IMF financing have not
led to action. Furthermore, frustration has been the
characteristic of the design of the new IMF facility
tomanage contagion, theContingency Credit Line
(CCL).
Fourth, even some of these advances in the
international financial architecture run the risk of
reversal. There has been growing reluctance by
developed countries to support large IMF lending
(or to contribute bilateral short-term lending) to
manage crises better. The main arguments given
have been that these large packages lead to excessive
moral hazard, which implies that both borrowers
and lenders behave more irresponsibly, knowing
that they will be “bailed out” and that taxpayer
money from industrialised countries should not,
in any case, be risked in these operations. These
arguments have been vastly overstated. If progress
was made on international debt workouts, this
would reducemoral hazard.However,mechanisms
such as international workouts, should be a
complement, and not a substitute, for IMF lending
in times of capital account crises.
Fifth, the slow progress in reforming the
international financial architecture and the inherent
asymmetry in the measures taken results in part
from limited participation of developing countries
in the fora where reform has been discussed, and
more generally in the institutions of global financial
governance. Enhancing the participation of
developing countries in these institutions would
imply significantly greater impulse for necessary
changes in the global financial architecture. These
changes, and the resulting positive impact on global
financial stability and growth, would not just benefit
developing countries; it would also have significant
direct and indirect benefits for the developed world.
A more balanced representation of developing
countries in key institutions and fora, such as the
IMF, theWorld Bank and the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) needs to be discussed in parallel
with a redefinition of their functions. It is also urgent
that developing countries be fully represented in
the Financial Stability Forum, and in standard-
setting bodies, like the Basel Banking Committee,
as they will be asked to implement the standards
there defined.
In what follows, we examine issues relating to
IMF financing facilities; world regulatory standards,
highlighting problems with Basle II; international
debt workouts; development finance; and regional
schemes. The article concludes with thoughts on
the political economy of international financial
reform.
2 IMF financing facilities
During the 1990s, capital account liberalisation
and the large scale of private capital flows greatly
increased the need for official liquidity to deal with
Is there Progress Towards a Development-orientated International Financial System?
61
sudden and large reversals of flows. As a result of
the 1997–98 Asian and Russian crises, IMF
resources were significantly enhanced. This
facilitated the provision of fairly large financial
packages that helped in the management and
containment of crises, though the conditionality
applied was often problematic.
Particularly, two new facilities were designed as
a result of these crises. The first was the
Supplementary Reserve Facility (SRF), which
facilitated the provision of fairly large, more
expensive, relatively short-term loans to countries
hit by crises, resulting from a sudden and disruptive
loss of market confidence reflected in pressure on
the capital account and themember’s reserves. The
SRF was useful in providing large loans to countries
like South Korea and Brazil, once they were hit by
major crises.
Contrary to the relative success with this new
facility, several of the developed countries recently
expressed their wish to establish limits on the scale
of lending through the SRF. Potential borrowers
rightly do not wish such limits to be set up, as in a
multiple equilibrium situation,more limited IMF
loans could imply that the undesirable bad
equilibrium could take place implying deeper crises
in individual countries, as well as more risk of
contagion to other countries. Clearly in that case
the SRF would be less effective.Delays in granting
IMF support or loans of an insufficient size may
well lead to a worse outcome thanmore rapid IMF
lending in adequate quantities. Delays in IMF
negotiations withArgentina were one of the factors
that led to a hypersensitivity of financial markets
to developments in South America and, therefore,
to a stronger regional contagion during 2002 than
was originally expected (ECLAC 2002b).This seems
to have led to a renewal of large-scale IMF lending,
as seen in the case of Brazil in mid-2002.
Furthermore, the September 2003 IMF deal with
Argentina showed some welcome flexibility.
The second facility created after the Asian and
Russian crises was a preventive one, theContingent
Credit Line (CCL). As the IMF defined it, the CCL
was created as ‘a precautionary line of defence
readily available against future balance of payments
problems that might arise from international
financial contagion’. The creation of the CCL was
a potentially very important and positive step
because it could significantly reduce the chances
of a country entering into a crisis, by providing
contingency lending agreed in advance.However,
the problem is that in the four years following its
creation no country applied to use it, even though
the terms and conditions were modified to make
the CCL more attractive to borrowers. The key
problem is that countries with “good” policies, and
who are perceived as such, fear that there could be
a stigma attached by themarkets if they applied for
a CCL. In particular, countries fear to be the first
to apply on their own for a CCL. The fact that the
CCL has not been used implies that it may be
suspended. This would seem very unfortunate and
a far better option is to make it more attractive.
To make this facility more attractive, and
diminish or eliminate any potential stigma attached
to it, some modification could be introduced.
Particularly, it could be agreed that all countries
that have been very favourably evaluated by the
IMF in their annualArticle IV consultations would
automatically qualify for the CCL. Therefore, a
country would have a right to draw on the CCL
should the need arise. This would imply that quite
a large number of countries, including the developed
ones, would qualify for theCCL (even though few
would use it), thus eliminating the current stigma
on its use. The fact that countries would be named
as eligible for the CCL by the IMF, would make it
a sign of strength (indicator of good policies), rather
than – as currently feared – a request for a CCL
being seen as a sign of possible future weakness.
3 Strengthening world regulatory
standards
Capital and credit markets have become increasingly
integrated between countries, in what is becoming
an increasingly internationalised market. These
markets have also become more integrated with
each other, as big financial conglomerates combine
activities in banking, securities, insurance and other
financial fields. In order for the globalised financial
system to work effectively to sustain both stability
and growth, appropriate transparency and
regulation of international financial loan and capital
markets is essential.
For regulation to be efficient, it is essential that
the domain of the regulator is the same as the
domain of themarket that is regulated. Ideally, this
would imply the need to create a world regulatory
authority, as Kaufman (1998), and Eatwell and
Taylor (2000) have suggested.However, this seems
at present unlikely, both because of the complexity
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of the task, and because of the unwillingness of
national governments and regulators to give up
sovereignty on this issue.
A second best alternative to creating a global
regulatory authority is to significantly improve
exchange of information and coordination amongst
regulators, both across countries and across financial
sectors. In the last two decades, there had been
initial steps in this field,mainly via the three Basel
Committees, of which themain one is the Banking
Committee. This started to generate, via soft law,
(that is via informal ad hoc arrangements that are
binding), common regulatory standards that are
initially applied by the regulatory authorities of the
countries participating in theCommittees, and then
– either by peer encouragement, by pressure from
the IMF and the World Bank and/or from the
markets – implemented by developing and
transition regulatory authorities.
A further step towards identifying vulnerabilities
and sources of systemic risk was the creation of the
Financial Stability Forum (FSF) following the
1997–98 crises in emerging markets. This is
intended to fill gaps in regulations and develop
consistent financial regulations across all types of
financial institutions. The work of the FSF and its
Working Parties has been valuable, but has been
insufficiently implemented, especially in developed
countries. The FSF Working Party recommended
important improvements on far greater transparency
of hedge funds and other highly leveraged
institutions (HLIs), but even these rather modest,
but important, steps have not been implemented
because in the US, the major country where HLIs
operate, Congress rejected two bills for improved
transparency (White 2000).
There are two significant weaknesses in the
operation of the FSF. One is its limited ability to
influence decisions to be taken by national
regulators, especially in source countries. The
second is the total lack of participation of developing
and transition economies in the main body of the
FSF. This poses not just problems of legitimacy, but
also of efficiency, as it accentuates the types of
asymmetries in the international financial system.
The potentially most important regulatory
development since the 1997–98 crises in emerging
markets is the proposed modification of the 1988
BaselCapitalAccord which could have a profound
impact both on international bank lending (its level,
cost and cyclicality) to developing countries and
on bank lending (its cyclicality and distribution),
within developing countries.
While the effects on developing countries are
not central to the new Basel Capital Accord (both
because its aim is to try to align banks’ regulatory
capital requirements with actual risk, and because
developing countries have no representation in the
Basel Banking Committee) very significant effects
of the new accord would be felt on developing
countries. This is particularly problematic given
the fact that bank lending to developing countries
has become negative since the Asian crisis (BIS
2001). Serious concerns existed that the January
2001 proposal could have large net negative effects
on developing countries. Later modifications,
especially those introduced in November 2001,
have dealt with some of the problems, and
somewhat diminished others. This is encouraging.
Nonetheless, the possibility that the proposed new
Basel Capital Accord could further discourage
lending to developing countries is still amatter of
great concern.
The key proposed changes relate to the
measurement of credit risk. In the proposedAccord,
there would be two basic approaches, the
standardised and the internal rating based (IRB)
ones.2 The new standardised approach addresses
several previous concerns raised by developing
countries, for example by reducing the incentive
towards short-term lending. However, the IRB
approach, if implemented in its current form, could
have important negative implications.
The first problematic aspect is that the proposed
IRB approach could further reduce international
bank lending and increase costs of such lending to
developing countries, particularly those (the large
majority) that do not have investment grades. Both
effects would institutionalise increased perceived
risk.
Second, and equally serious, the proposed IRB
approach would exacerbate pro-cyclical tendencies
within the banking systems. The drive for risk-
weights that more accurately reflect the probability
of default (PD) is inherently pro-cyclical; during
an upturn, average PD falls, and the IRB approach,
based on banks’ internal riskmodel, would reflect
lower capital requirements; during a downturn or
recession, average PD will increase, as deteriorating
economic conditions cause existing loans to
“migrate” to higher risk categories.This raises overall
capital requirements, and as it is difficult to raise
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capital in a recession, it may lead to a credit crunch,
which would further deepen the downturn.
Concerns with increased pro-cyclicality of the
proposed new CapitalAccord are widespread (see,
for example, Goodhart 2002).
Increasing pro-cyclicality would go against what
is increasingly accepted as best practice, which is
to introduce a neutral or counter-cyclical elements
into regulation, so as to counteract the natural pro-
cyclicality of banking and capitalmarkets (BIS 2001;
Ocampo and Chiappe 2002). For developing
countries, increased pro-cyclicality of bank lending
is particularly damaging, given that this increases
the likelihood of crises, as well as their development
and financial cost.
A new BaselCapitalAccord proposal, that would
overcome some of the problems listed above should
include some of the following elements: (a) in the
IRB approach, capital requirements should be
lowered for low-rated borrowers which include
most developing countries; this would imply a
significant flattening of the IRB curve (that is, the
capital required for lending to borrowers perceived
as more risky, would not increase so sharply); (b)
a special curve for small- and medium-sized
enterprises was introduced by the BaselCommittee;
if that is implemented, the possibility of a separate
curve for developing countries should be seriously
studied, to avoid excess discouragement of bank
lending and tomore accurately reflect risk of lending
to them, particularly the benefits of diversification;
and (c) serious attention given to counter-cyclical
elements, such as creating forward-looking
provisions, to mitigate inherent pro-cyclicality of
the IRB approach.
4 International debt standstills
and workout procedures
Although no actions have been adopted, there have
been extensive discussions on the need for
international rules on debt standstills and orderly
workout procedures. As it is well known, such
mechanisms are required to avoid the coordination
problems implicit in chaotic capital flight, to
guarantee an appropriate sharing of adjustments
between lenders and borrowers, and to avoid “moral
hazard” issues associated with emergency financing.
Though a great deal of work and discussions
have been carried out in this field, progress for any
radical change was frozen when the IMF Board
rejected (mainly due to US opposition) proposals
for orderly debt workout procedures, the Sovereign
Debt RestructuringMechanism (SDRM).
Nevertheless, quite significant progress has been
made on more voluntary initiatives, with several
major developing countries introducing collective
action clauses into their new bond issues. This
would facilitate future debt restructuring. It is very
positive that up to now, bonds which include
collective action clauses do not have higher spreads
(that is, do not imply higher costs) than those
without.
It must be stressed that multilateral credit
support mechanisms, particularly by multilateral
development banks (MDBs), would be required
during the period following a debt restructuring.
As an essential role of such support should be to
catalyse the reinsertion of countries into private
capital markets, a possible mechanism could be a
guarantee fundmanaged by MDBs.This mechanism
would guarantee private sector lending to private
or public sector borrowers in the affected countries
with adequate provisions (partial guarantees, higher
in the initial years, at an appropriate cost). This
issue has not been included in recent debates and
should thus be added as an integral element of any
international debt workout scheme.
5 Development finance
The issues of volatility of private capital flows and
contagion have been at the centre of discussion on
the international financial architecture in recent
years.However, they only capture some of themost
problematic features of international finance.
Another worrisome issue, the marginalisation of
the poorest countries from private capital flows, is
equally important. These countries depend on
official development assistance, whose largest
component, bilateral aid, has lagged behind.
Bilateral aid has fallen in real terms, leading to
a reduction in official development assistance (ODA)
in relation to GDP: from 0.35 per cent of the GDP
of industrialised countries in themid-1980s to 0.22
per cent in 1998–2000, i.e. one-third of the
internationally agreed target of 0.7 per cent ofGDP.
Trends are not uniform, however. Some countries
– Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden –
meet that target, and a few increased ODA in the
1990s, particularly the UK in the late 1990s. The
overall trend and the low current level ofODA are
largely determined by the evolution of aid flows
from a few large countries, particularly the USA.
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There is also strong volatility of private capital
flows, in particular short-termdebt, but also long-
term debt and equity flows. These private flows
experienced a strong decline during theAsian crisis
and never recovered. Thus, although the initial
reduction was viewed as a sign of volatility, it led
to more permanent regime change in terms of the
availability of private financing. Therefore, the
evolution of private financial flows may be viewed
as characterised by two different cycles: a short-
termone, associated to volatility in the strict sense
of the term, and a medium-term cycle, in which
phases of “risk appetite” are followed after some
years by periods of strong risk aversion. The only
steady source of private external financing has been
foreign direct investment. Even in this case,
however, the strong upward trend characteristic of
the 1990s was interrupted at the end of the decade
and has been followed by a decline, particularly
during the recent world recession.
From the point of view of development policy
and the Millennium Development Goals, one of
themost important aspects of private capital flows
is their strong concentration in middle-income
countries. The share of low-income nations in
private financing has been not only lower than their
share of the total population of developing countries,
but also lower than their share of developing
countries’ GDP. This fact is particularly striking in
bond financing, commercial bank lending and
portfolio flows (for more details, seeGriffith-Jones
andOcampo 2003).
Low-income countries have thus been
marginalised fromprivate flows and have depended
on declining official development assistance,
particularly grants coming mostly in the form of
bilateral aid. If we again exclude India, this is the
only component of the net resource flows to
developing countries that is highly progressive, in
the sense that the share of low-income countries in
net flows exceeds not only their share in developing
countries’GDP but also in population. This is also
marginally true ofmultilateral financing, excluding
the IMF.
Due to the importance ofODA in the financing
of low-income countries, this issue has received a
significant attention in recent debates.
Commitments made at the United Nations
Conference onFinancing for Development inMarch
2002 will lead to a reversal of the adverse trend
experienced by bilateral aid in recent decades.
Nonetheless, those commitments represent only a
quarter of the US$50 billion aid requirements
estimated by the Secretary General of the United
Nations (and similar estimations by theWorldBank)
to halve extremepoverty by 2015 and would remain
equally below the target of 0.7 per cent of GDP,
which was reiterated at the Conference.
Recent proposals, such as theUK suggestion for
an International Financing Facility, that would front
local aid flows, by obtaining private finance, are
very valuable, though amore permanent increase
in aid would be even more desirable.
6 Regional schemes
The role of regional institutions in the international
financial system is one of themost prominent items
missing from themainstreamdiscussion and agenda
on international financial reform. It is absent from
the main Northern reports and from the views on
financial reform which come from the Bretton
Woods institutions.
This is an important deficiency. There are,
indeed, several arguments for a strong role for
regional institutions in international finance.3 The
first relate to the growth ofmacroeconomic linkages
at the regional level, as a result of the growth of
intra-regional trade and capital flows. This creates
a demand for regional surveillance and consultation
ofmacroeconomicpolicies, as well as for peer review
of national prudential regulation and supervision
of domestic financial systems. One advantage of
regional surveillance is that asymmetries of
information are smaller at this level.
The second are the classical risk-pooling
arguments.Regional and sub-regional development
banks, even those made up entirely of developing
countries, are likely to face lower risks than
individual members. This creates the potential for
profitable financial intermediation.Also, contagion
of crises often starts within regions; therefore,
regional mechanisms for liquidity provision can
provide a first line of defence in deterring contagion.
This preventive line of defence is facilitated by the
fact that, despite contagion, critical demands for
funds do not coincide exactly in time, a fact that
generates a useful role for regional reserve funds
and swap arrangements. Moreover, the sense of
“ownership” of regional and sub-regional
development banks and reserve funds by developing
countries creates a special relationship between
them and member countries that helps to reduce
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the risks that these institutions face, further
encouraging the virtues of risk pooling.
The third set of arguments relates to the virtues
of an international order that combines world and
regional institutions. Given the heterogeneity of
the international community, world and regional
institutions can play useful complementary roles,
particularly inmacroeconomic policy coordination,
in the adaptation of international norms to the
specific regulatory traditions and in reducing
learning costs and sharing experiences in
institutional development. At the same time, for
smaller countries, the access to a broader alternative
set of institutions for crisis management and
development finance, including regional ones,may
be particularly valuable, as they have relatively less
influence and bargaining power vis-à-vis global
institutions. More generally, the creation and
strengthening of regional developing institutions
will help increase developing countries’ ability to
participate and influence the global financial
architecture negotiations.
The history of regional financial cooperation has
been particularly rich in postwar Western Europe,
from the development ofEuropean Payments Union
and the European Investment Bank, to a series of
arrangements for macroeconomic coordination and
cooperation, that eventually led to the current
monetary union ofmost members of the European
Union. To a lesser extent, financial cooperation has
been present in the developing world over several
decades. One remarkable example are the
institutions designed in the context of Andean
cooperation. This includes the Andean
Development Corporation, which provides
development finance to both public and private
sectors in several Latin American countries, and
the Latin American Reserve Fund, which includes
Andean countries andCosta Rica, and has provided
emergency liquidity financing to all Andean
countries over the past decades.
The major advances in this area in recent years
have taken place in Asia. They include, first, the
May 2000 ChiangMaiAgreement betweenASEAN
countries, China, the Republic ofKorea and Japan,
to create a swap arrangement among central banks
(Park andWang 2000). This initiative followed the
Japanese suggestion to create an Asian Monetary
Fund, which generated major opposition by the
IMF during its 1997 HongKong annual meetings.
The second was the creation of the ASEAN
SurveillanceProcess, for exchangingmacroeconomic
and financial information, and providing early
warning signals and peer review among ASEAN
countries. In Latin America and the Caribbean,
there have been some steps towards developing
mechanisms for macroeconomic coordination in
the context of the four sub-regional integration
schemes and initiatives to strengthen the Latin
American Reserve Fund.
These experiences indicate that regional bodies
can be very effective in providing liquidity,
facilitating development finance and sustaining
trade links. They can also contribute to
macroeconomic policy peer review and
coordination.Nonetheless, these institutions remain
limited in their scope so far, and are not recognised
as central to the international financial architecture.
This would require formal links between the IMF
and regional reserve funds and swap arrangements.
It also requires an explicit policy by theWorld Bank
to support regional development banks, including
new institutions exclusively owned by developing
countries.
An institutional framework such as that
suggested would have two positive features. First
of all, it may bring more stability to the world
economy by supplying essential services that can
hardly be provided by a few global institutions,
particularly in the face of a dynamic process of open
regionalism. Second, from the point of view of the
equilibrium of world relations, it would be more
balanced than a system based on a few world
organisations.This would increase the commitment
of less powerful players to abide by rules that
contribute to world and regional stability.
7 The political economy of
international financial reform
Progress on international financial reformhas been
uneven and asymmetrical; more progress has been
achieved in areas implemented nationally by
developing countries (e.g. Codes and Standards)
than in the equally important and complementary
international measures (e.g. provision of sufficient
official liquidity and development finance, and
design of international debt workout procedures).
What are themain reasons for this uneven progress?
More importantly, what strategy and bargaining
tactics could be most productive for achieving a
more symmetrical process?
Clearly, the asymmetries in the international
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financial reform process reflect certain political
realities. The most powerful governments, and
especially their financial authorities, have not
thrown their weight consistently behind a deep
international financial reform, in spite of their
temporary enthusiasmfor it after the 1997–98Asian
and Russian crises. In large part, this enthusiasm
derived from the brief credit crunch in the
industrialised world generated by these crises.
An important reason for lack of consistent
developed country support for the reformprocess
may be that some powerful actors in those countries
(e.g. major banks and other financial actors) do not
see it in their interest to support or promote major
changes in the international financial architecture.
This seems quite clear in the discussions on an
internationally agreed orderly debt workout
mechanism. Another problem is that those who
would benefit most from such changes in developed
countries (e.g. shareholders and workers of
companies trading and investing long-term in
developing economies, or who support
development in poor countries) are not represented
properly in financial decision-making processes,
such as development ministries and NGOs.
For these reasons, the main impulse for
international financial reformmight have to come
from developing countries. However, developing
countries have their own restrictions. First andmost
important, they have relatively limited power, as
reflected in their exclusion or limited participation
in key bodies. Second, developing countries have
seen their ability to generate strong coalitions
weakened; this may be linked to the “policy
competition” to attract foreign capital, and thus the
resulting unwillingness to make or support
proposals that couldmodify their image as friendly
to foreign investors. Finally, developing countries
– especially but not only the poorest ones – may
have insufficient technical capacity and resources
to generate complex blueprints for international
financial reform, and participate effectively in
complex negotiation processes.
If conscious and deliberate efforts are not made
to overcome the basic asymmetries in global power
relations, and obstacles (technical and non-
technical) that prevent the development of
international coalitions to compensate for these
power imbalances, the international financial agenda
would continue to be biased towards the views of
a limited set of financial and governmental actors
in the industrialised countries and the negative
impact of this agenda and policies on the rest of the
world – and in particular developing countries –
will not be fully taken account of.
A second reason restricting progress in
international financial reform is the reluctance of
most countries to give up economic sovereignty to
international organisations. This is particularly
marked in industrialised countries, but also evident
in developing countries. In this sense, regional
organisations and mechanisms may be very
valuable, both in themselves and as stepping stones
towards global organisations andmechanisms, and
for improving the bargaining position of developing
countries for a better financial architecture. A
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Table 1: Objectives of key actors
Dominant objectives Other objectives
Developed country nGrowth in their own economies nGrowth in developing countries
governments n Profits for their financial sectors nNo crises
nGlobal financial stability
nNo large bail-outs
Developing country nGrowth in their own economies nGrowth in developed countries
governments nGlobal financial stability
n Stable and adequate flows
Banking and financial nMaximise profits nGlobal financial stability
markets nGrowth in developed and
developing economies
problem here is that most countries (with the
exception of the European Union), have been
reluctant to give up sovereignty even to regional
organisations.
Nevertheless, there are two very positive
elements that may be helpful in the process of
genuine international financial reform.One is that
all key actors involved share a common objective,
which is that they are in favour of – and benefit
from – sustained growth in developing countries.
As seen in Table 1, for some actors this is more
important than others, but all share this objective.
A second potentially very positive element is the
existence of a set of actors in developed countries,
who are, and could become evenmore, important
allies of developing countries in building a better
international financial system. These include
government departments not concerned directly
with finance (e.g. Development Cooperation
Ministries), NGOs, political parties and
parliamentarians, as well as non-financial
corporations. In different ways, and for different
reasons, these actors are supportive of more rapid
growth in developing countries, and therefore are
or could become very supportive of an international
financial reform that helps make growth possible.
For this purpose, developing countries’
governments need to have an active dialogue on
international financial reform,not just with financial
authorities in developed countries, with market
actors and International Financial Institutions (who
clearly are the main actors in the reform process)
but also with other actors in the developed world.
Developing countries could attempt to design
and offer a “grand bargain” on international and
national financial reform that would be attractive
to a whole range of actors in developed countries,
both in the public and the private sector, as well as
supportive of their own growth and development.
Such a bargain would have two sets of elements.
Developing countries could say they would be keen
to implement initiatives that are of particular interest
to developed economies, such as Codes and
Standards on financial regulation and a fuller
liberalisation of their capital accounts, if, and only
if, developed countries start reforming the global
financial system in ways that would facilitate larger
and more stable capital flows to developing
countries and that wouldmake costly crises in these
countries less likely. Whilst such a reformed
international financial system would not exist, they
would clearly be less able and less willing to open
their capital accounts fully, as the potential risks of
doing so could outweigh the benefits. Particularly,
developing countries could argue that implementing
Codes and Standards and a commitment to adopt
proper domestic macroeconomic policies should
be explicitly linked to some regulation of developed
countries’ financial markets to help avoid excessive
surges of potentially reversible capital flows to
developing countries; tomechanisms that encourage
long-term flows; to the design of (low-
conditionality) international liquidity mechanisms
that would significantly protect individual
developing countries from crises and stop them
from spreading to other countries; and to fair
multilateral debt workout mechanisms that would
be used tomanage solvency crises (debt overhangs).
Thus, developing countries that followed good
macroeconomic policies and significantly improved
their financial regulation (as certified, for example,
in their annualArticle IV IMF consultations) could
have virtually automatic access to sufficient IMF
lending if hit by a crises whose origin was not of its
own making, but was due to unexpected changes
in perceptions of international lenders on investors
or due to large terms of trade shocks. Low-income
countries that followed good macroeconomic
policies and improved financial regulation would
have sufficient access not just to international
liquidity, but also to development finance. Debt
workout mechanisms would only be used when
crises faced by developing countries were due to
unsustainable debt burdens (and would not be used
when they are associated to insufficient international
liquidity), and appropriate mechanisms would be
designed to guarantee financing in the post-debt
restructuring environment to facilitate reinsertion
into private capital markets.
Such a bargain would provide incentives for
developed countries tomake necessary international
changes, as they would know that they would
ensure the desired changes in developing countries
and vice versa. Collective action problems could
thus be overcome if genuine progress was made
simultaneously by developed and developing
countries.Most importantly, the result would be of
great value, not just to developing countries, but
also to developed ones.
Developing countries could draw here interesting
lessons from both the bargaining tactics used and
the vision presented by Keynes in negotiations that
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led, at BrettonWoods, to the creation of the postwar
international financial order (Skidelsky 2001). As
regards bargaining tactics, Keynes presented two
clear alternatives: an “ideal” scheme, with key
international elements – such as a large IMF – and
a “second best” case, wherein the UK would
reluctantly follow a far more closed approach in
trade and the capital account if the international
financial system was not properly developed; there
was, he argued, nomiddle way (though in practice
he made some important concessions later).
Suitably adapted to the features of the early
twenty-first century world economy, developing
countries can argue that the same two clear options
remain:
1. An appropriate international financial system,
that would support development and make
crises far less likely and less costly, not just for
them but particularly for the global economy.
Developing countries could contribute to this
new IFA by implementing regulatory standards,
adopting goodmacro-policies and by gradually
liberalising their capital accord. 
2. An incomplete and lopsided international
financial system that could not guarantee
supporting developing country aims, and where
they would not be able to open fully their capital
accounts, as they would regretfully have to
protect their interests by having, as a “second
best solution”, more rather than less national
policy autonomy. Similarly, they may be forced
to rely on regional institutions andmechanisms
even to perform functions that could be best
performed globally, given vacuums in the existing
global financial architecture.
8 Conclusion
To conclude, significant international financial
reform is crucial to create a system that supports,
and does not undermine, development and poverty
reduction. The current system, with often
insufficiently badly distributed, and very volatile
private flows – and excessively limited international
public institutions to deal with these problems – is
highly problematic and implies that the financial
dimension of globalisation is in many ways its
Achilles heel. It is therefore crucial to design an
international financial system that facilitates
sufficient and sufficiently stable private flows to
different developing countries, as well as preventing
andmanaging better financial and currency crises.
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Notes
* This article draws on and updates a longer document
published by the Expert Group on Development Issues
(EGDI), Stockholm (www.egdi.gov.se). Financial support
from theUKDepartment for InternationalDevelopment
(DFID) in the context of the Globalisation and Poverty
Programme (project R7900), from the Ford Foundation,
and from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
gratefully acknowledged. I am very grateful to John
Humphrey for his valuable suggestions. For more
information on research on financial architecture, see
www.gapresearch.org/finance/privatecapital.html and
www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/Finance/intfinindex.html
1. See the article by Valpy Fitzgerald, in this Bulletin.
2. For amore detailed discussion of these issues, seeGriffith-
Jones et al. (2002). See also the Proceedings of
Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Conference on
Enhancing Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries,
July 2002, for views of theBaselCommittee (www.bis.org)
and the Bank of England (www.bankofengland.co.uk).
3. For a broader discussion of these issues, see ECLAC
(2002a, Ch. 2), Agosin (2001), Ocampo (1999, 2002)
and Park andWang (2000).
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